Human Mobility Through Closed Borders:
The Impact of Morocco’s European and
Algerian Relations on Sub-Saharan Immigration

Caitryn McCallum
SIT Study Abroad
Morocco: Migration Studies
Academic Director: Dr. Said Graiouid
Fall 2008

1

Abstract
In order to understand the domestic matters of any country, it becomes necessary
to not only engage in the workings of its internal structures, but to also examine how its
relations with foreign powers are shaping its function as a state. As is the case with
Morocco, the sub-Saharan immigration that has become of prime concern to many during
recent years, due to a growing and universal fear of the ‘other’ as a threat to nationhood,
has not only had an impact on Morocco as a country to this day, but also continues to
shape Morocco for the future. This research aims to examine the ways in which
Morocco’s foreign affairs, in terms of historical, political, and economic ties, have
affected its domestic engagement with sub-Saharan immigration. Morocco’s relations
with both the European Union and Algeria have had a profound impact on Morocco’s
ability as a state to cope with the relatively new phenomenon of sub-Saharan
immigration, and due to Morocco’s weak institutional capacity, has further challenged
Morocco in its development into a nation-state.
In order to conduct my research, I began by visiting the town of Oujda, located at
the Algerian border through which the majority of immigrants pass; it is here that subSaharan immigrants are installed in camps. I contacted a law professor at the Oujda
University, who had written much on my area of interest and was furthermore involved
with the Moroccan Organization of Human Rights. Professor Amarti was incredibly
helpful to me from the moment I arrived in Oujda, from informing me as to the workings
of his organizations, to familiarizing me with the town of Oujda. I also contacted
Hicham Baraka, president and of the Moroccan NGO ABCDS, who informed me that
due to the tight security crack-down within Oujda, it would be difficult for him to host
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me for a short internship in his office. In thanking him for his response, I wrote that I
would be traveling to Oujda even so, and that I would greatly appreciate even ten minutes
to speak with him. When I arrived in Oujda, Baraka called me to offer his help with my
research. The remainder of my stay in Oujda surpassed all of my expectations due to his
hospitality and willingness to physically show me the plight of sub-Saharans at this
closed border, and the tense situation that presently exists here. Concerning my methods
of research when I returned to Rabat, I did my best to talk with as many people I could
and make contact with immigrants themselves, as well as association leaders and
members. The interviews I conducted took place in Rabat’s administration buildings,
cafes, and parks (in some cases, the only place where talk with an immigrant without
papers would not compromise his situation), as well as the poorest neighborhoods and the
homes of these immigrants. I did not include the true identity of certain people in my
final paper, as some of those I spoke are presently living in illegal, vulnerable, or
compromising situations within Morocco. Though these persons’ names have been
changed, their accounts remain untouched.
The hospitality and openness I received in Oujda was similar to what I met in
Rabat. My research in Rabat could not have been accomplished without the willingness
of all of those who helped me in this Independent Study Project—be they my advisor,
members of non-governmental organizations, association, leaders and members, or
refugees, asylum seekers, and immigrants themselves. These people not only helped me
to expand my knowledge of the subject, but also taught me the utmost generosity. I will
forget neither the time, effort, and energy of those who helped, nor the willingness of
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certain individuals to share stories that are in some cases no easy feat to recount to
anyone, much less a complete stranger. To these people, I am truly grateful.
There are without a doubt some obstacles that I encountered during my research
period. The first of these was the boundary of time that existed to complete this project.
While a month appears to be a significant amount of time for such a project, I found that
the logistics involved and time needed during field research limited my study’s scope.
As a result of the time constraint, I was not able to research all of the aspects of subSaharan immigration as I would have liked to. Immigrants in Morocco possessing legal
papers do hold a presence among Moroccan society, and confront difficulties in regards
to working, discrimination, and establishing identity here that are worthy topics of
research. I came to the conclusion, however, that I would focus solely on the illegal
immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees, as these groups of people best pertain to my
thesis. Another obstacle that I encountered was remaining completely neutral in the
writing of this report. I found it rather difficult in conducting my research, to not slant
my opinions on the behalf of the immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees I spoke with.
The conditions in which they live are by no means easy, and as a human being, I could
not help but feel for their desperate situations, while maintaining the perspective of a
researcher. With this perspective, I was not limited to recognizing the gravity and
frequency of the human rights violations that take place within Morocco as a result of
external pressures. This perspective allowed me acknowledge that while Morocco does
not possess strong institutions to improve the present situation, the ability to make
influential changes in Morocco rests in the mind of each and every Moroccan who even
considers briefly the issues that surround sub-Saharan migration into Morocco.
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Morocco’s constantly changing migration dynamic has drastically altered its
fundamental structures of policy, its foundations, and its society. The European Union’s
plan to form political agreements with Morocco in order to cease large illegal migration
flows is at the expense of Morocco’s rather weak infrastructural capacity, and
furthermore at the expense of the human rights of many of these immigrants. Morocco’s
relations with both the European Union and Algeria have had a profound impact on
Morocco’s ability as a state to cope with the relatively new phenomenon of sub-Saharan
immigration, and due to Morocco’s weak institutional capacity, has further challenged
Morocco in its development into a nation-state. Following the high number of illegal
migrants crossing into Europe, it became the European Union’s goal to externalize the
immigration issue to countries from which these immigrants arrived, and Morocco was a
prime state with which to enforce this goal through forging agreements that bestowed
financial aid on Morocco in return. Morocco’s attempt to uphold such agreements has
been challenged, however, by its relations with Algeria, a transit country for sub-Saharan
immigrants entering Morocco and one that has a history of turbulent relations with
Morocco. With growing pressure from the European Union to control the influx of subSaharan immigrants into Morocco, has led to an increasingly tense situation for migrants
at both the borders with other countries and within the borders of the Moroccan state. Not
only does Morocco lack the infrastructure to best grapple with such changes presently,
but it also faces grave problems in the future if such a tense phase within the course of its
development is not soon addressed in a productive and supportive manner.
The European Union began to establish agreements with Morocco that would not
only strengthen its relationship with Morocco, but would further aid in combating the
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illegal immigration that was of great concern to Europeans. The European Commission, a
legislative branch of the European Union, decided to implement a balanced approach of
agreements with the countries of Northern Africa. This plan resulted in the European
Neighborhood Policy, whereby the EU established agreements with countries at its
borders yet not part of the EU. The policy gives countries financial aid in exchange for
accepting certain reforms, such as those governing human rights and immigration. The
European Union’s vision of enlarging its own sphere was completed in 2004 with this
policy. The European Union and Morocco signed an Association Agreement in 2000 as
part of this European Neighborhood Policy, thereby declaring that Morocco would
commit to certain economic, social, and humanitarian reforms. Specifically, in signing
the Association Agreement, Morocco’s established that it would be willing to facilitate
further dialogue with these countries in combating the growing problem of illegal
immigration (Mrabet). In exchange, the European Union gave Morocco certain trade
benefits and financial aid.
Under the umbrella of this Association Agreement, the European Commission
and Morocco drafted an Action Plan, stating therein that it “has a time frame of three to
five years. It will enable a more targeted implementation of the instruments provided for
in the Association Agreement between the EU and Morocco and will support the
Moroccan objective of bringing its economic and social structures more in line with those
of the Union” (Action Plan). Among the goals for Morocco set in place by the Action
Plan are those to “prevent and combat illegal migration to and via Morocco” (Action Plan
2.4; 48). Concerning management of the Moroccan border, the Action Plan highlights the
desire to “strengthen organizational and institutional capacity for border control and
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surveillance of entry and exit areas” (Action Plan 2.4; 51). Despite aiming to strengthen
the ‘institutional capacity’ necessary for border control, it remains to be seen where the
European support thus far has been in helping Morocco implement such objectives. In
September of 2002, the European Commission met with representatives from Morocco,
as well as those from Egypt, Tunisia, and Algeria, to begin dialogue on the subject of
migration, with the goal of established political agreements. After reviewing the
conclusions drawn from ten European experts’ visit to Morocco, the European
Commission decided that the “answer was more cash incentives and the promise of a less
belligerent relationship through the creation of an EU-Moroccan monitoring commission
to examine the problem as equals” (Fekete). The prospect of a more level bargaining field
with Europe, combined with financial inducement, spurred Morocco to adopt further
measures that were compliant with Europe’s visions of externalizing the immigration
situation to other countries.
In order to further prove Morocco’s willingness to maintain these agreements
with the EU, Morocco adopted Law 02-03 on November 11, 2003. This law, “relative to
foreigners entering and staying in the Kingdom of Morocco, and to illegal emigration and
immigration,” in theory preserves Europe’s hopes for Morocco’s method in addressing
illegal immigration and emigration. Some, however, feel as though this law does not
function well within Morocco. Mohammed Amarti, professor of Law at the University
Mohammed I in Oujda and member of The Moroccan Organization for Human Rights
(OMDH) feels as though “there is very often not strict respect for this law. In my opinion,
it is very restrictive and based on repression. I feel as though this law should be revised
and made better; the law right now is inspired by pressure from Europe”. Morocco’s
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lacking institutional power to carry out the objectives set forth by Law 02-03 have
resulted in officials’ ability to interpret the law as they see fit, or in some cases to
completely disregard its intentions. As a result of this disregard for the law, there have
been numerous and grave violations of the rights of sub-Saharans on Moroccan soil.
Article 26 of this law, concerning the expulsion of immigrants, excludes the expulsion of
pregnant women, minors, and refugees. Despite the vulnerable situation of these people,
this article is one that Moroccan police frequently disregard during police raids, for
example. Abraham, a Cameroonian living in Rabat without legal papers, explains, “I left
Rabat for the bush of Fnideq (Moroccan city near the border of the Spanish enclave
Ceuta), where I was caught with others, including pregnant women, and brought to
Tangier to stay in a prison cell for five days…then we were brought to Oujda (Moroccan
border-town), and then to ‘no-man’s land.” ‘No-man’s land’ refers to the desert border
between Algeria and Morocco, in which there are drastically high temperatures in
summers months, and freezing temperatures during the winter months. The harsh
conditions for those already vulnerable, such as pregnant women, multiply when
considering the amount of lawlessness here as a result of the criminal groups at this
desert area (Violence and Immigration 14). The various occasions in which the rights of
pregnant women, refugees, and children are not considered by Moroccan authorities
proves a complete disregard for Article 26 of the law 02-03 that protects these people.
Violations of Moroccan law 02-03 since its adoption have left immigrants in
precarious and at times life-threatening situations. Despite these violations, there is
evidence of authorities’ recognition of this law, and of improvement in respecting its
articles. Pasteur Willy Bayanga, an immigrant from the Democratic Republic of the
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Congo, along with other sub-Saharan immigrants of all nationalities, founded the first
organization in Morocco for ‘les sans-papiers’—those without legal papers. He expressed
that the work of ‘Le Conseil des Migrants Sub-Sahariens du Maroc’—The Council of
Sub-Saharan Migrants of Morocco—in Rabat, along with various other vocal
associations that are concerned with the rights of illegal immigrants in Morocco, have
started to cause some changes. Bayanga explained to me that: “Before 2004, these [basic
human rights] were constantly violated. There were no associations to stop this cruelty.
The first thing to do is to denounce these violations, as women especially need to be
protected. Today, there have been less women and children as part of the police raids
than before.” In certain cases such as these, denunciations of migrant treatment—by
media, associations, and government officials—have led to increased awareness of the
violations of this law within Moroccan borders. Because Morocco must continue to prove
its interest in upholding human rights to the European Union standards, closer adherence
to the law has come under recent attention. Despite the challenges faced in implementing
Law 02-03 within Morocco’s borders, caused by the lack of infrastructural institutions to
effectively enforce the law among Moroccan authorities, there has been gradual
improvement concerning migrant treatment.
The European Union continues to implement a number of strategies in the realm
of the Mediterranean, especially in Morocco, in order to strengthen Morocco’s capacity
to hinder the flow of illegal immigration, yet the success of such programs without
sufficient institutional support in Morocco remains to be seen. In July of 2006, with the
support of the European Commission, members of the European Union and other
European states met with 25 African countries and several organizations, including the
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African Union, in Rabat, Morocco, to discuss lasting solutions to migratory challenges.
The Rabat conference ended with the adoption of a plan of action and a political
declaration “to bring concrete, effective, durable solutions to the challenge of migratory
flows thanks to a communal, global, and equal approach.” This Action Plan reinforced
much of the previous dialogues on controlling illegal immigration, while also
highlighting the importance of “cooperation between judicial and police operations, and
aid to victims." The conference’s focused approach to the migration challenges brought
about necessary dialogue, yet within the institutional frame of the Action Plan, failed to
establish measures in securing solid institutions within Morocco and other African
countries to support the previously-mentioned clauses regarding immigration.
The European Union and Morocco strengthened their partnership on October 13,
2008, at the 7th Session of the Association Council’s meeting in Luxembourg, when
Morocco was granted ‘advanced status’ within the realm of the European Neighborhood
Policy. Measures approved by both Morocco and the EU included those “in political and
security matters, the preparation of a comprehensive and deeper free trade agreement, the
gradual integration of Morocco into a number of EU area policies, and the development
of people-to-people exchanges.” The European Union granted Morocco the first
‘advanced status’ within the European Neighborhood for its continued reforms in
approaching European visions and policies. While it seems as if this status has advanced
Morocco’s ties with Europe, there is doubt that Morocco is ready to engage in the
implications of this position. In considering Morocco’s ability to carry out such reforms
implied in the ‘advanced status’, Khadija Ryadi, president of the Moroccan Association
of Human Rights (AMDH) feels that “in the advanced status granted by the EU to
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Morocco, the European side failed to turn the agreement into a mechanism which makes
Morocco acknowledge its obligations, turn them into laws, and respect them…the human
rights struggle will not take place through the EU; rather, it is a domestic affair”
(Cherkaoui). Echoing her thoughts on the unbalanced approach regarding trade and
immigration policies between the European Union and Morocco in awarding an advanced
status to Morocco, Hicham Rachidi, a member of the Antiracist Group of
Accompaniment and of the Defense of Foreigners and Migrants in Morocco (GADEM)
expressed concern of the results of this advanced status on immigration in Morocco.
“This accord represents a pragmatic approach of immigration, that’s to say that the EU is
going to close its eyes to the repressive practices of Morocco,” while gaining through
“undeniable economic advantages” (Plasse). Based on the present situation of immigrants
in Morocco, and the numerous human rights violations that have occurred over recent
years within its borders in order to abide by previous accords signed with Europe
regarding illegal immigration, the ‘advanced status’ is one that has altered the European
and Moroccan relationship; the effectiveness of such a change will be seen in the ways
such status impacts the increasingly urgent state of sub-Saharan immigration in Morocco.
Furthermore, in the basic exchange of trade opportunities with Morocco for Morocco’s
recognition of its responsibility to combat illegal immigration, the European Union
augments pressure in externalizing its own difficulties with immigration to the Moroccan
state.
Morocco has tightened security, commenced harsher defensive tactics, and
bestowed greater power to authorities in order to carry out Europe’s sweeping reforms for
strict border control. Morocco has enacted these efforts in the absence of institutions to
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monitor and support such actions. Closing the eastern border of Morocco against subSaharan immigrants has resulted in a number of human rights violations, which further
challenge the ability of Morocco’s infrastructure to address humanitarian issues. Funded
by the European Union, Morocco’s efforts to block the passage of immigrants has
transformed Oujda from border town to place of residency for these sub-Saharan
migrants, where they have installed temporary camps. Less than 15 km from Algeria, at a
border that has been closed officially since 1994, Oujda is not only hosts immigrants who
have recently crossed the Algerian border, but is also the return point for those
immigrants gathered by Moroccan police during raids within other Moroccan cities
(Mokhliss). To compound the situation in these camps—one of scarce food and blankets
during Oujda’s freezing winter, and the shelter of mere plastic tarps—is the constant fear
of police raids in the name of ‘sustaining security’ here. Because Moroccan police aim to
prevent these immigrants from going further into Morocco, they conduct frequent and
unannounced police raids to make arrests, resulting in injuries and even deaths among the
estimated 1700 to 2000 sub-Saharan immigrants within Morocco (Mokhliss). The
Moroccan group Doctors Without Borders’ (DWB) study of cases from 2003 to 2005
revealed that 52% of all cases of violence against sub-Saharan immigrants was
committed by Moroccan security forces; criminal groups, human-trafficking networks,
and Spanish security forces represented the remainder of violence perpetrators (Violence
and Immigration 8). DWB provides medical help for these immigrants, and further help
on the terrain—be it in the form of blankets, food, or spreading awareness of their
plight—comes largely from the only Moroccan NGO to work with the sub-Saharan
immigrants at the border, the Béni Znassen Association for Development, Culture, and

12

Solidarity (ABCDS).
President Hicham Baraka founded ABCDS in 2005 with other activists to give
emergency help to immigrants in Oujda camps and to fight for human rights on their
behalf through raising awareness of their deplorable conditions. When asked about the
purpose of these police raids, Baraka responded, “The Moroccan police attack the
immigrants in the forests of Oujda at 4:00, at 5:00 in the morning. They burn blankets,
jackets, and why? … The problem now is that Morocco is playing the policeman of
Europe. [Europe] wants to block the immigrants in Morocco… but it doesn’t know just
how many are dying.” I visited a camp in Oujda with Baraka one night after Baraka got
word that there was an immigrant, Joseph, seriously injured by the Moroccan police in a
recent struggle. The walk to the camps from his office was long and indirect; Baraka
explained that the new strategy of Moroccan police is to follow Baraka to be aware of his
interaction with the immigrants and to know of their whereabouts (I myself was later
followed from his office; Baraka explained that I would be mistaken for a European
journalist writing a story on the immigrants’ situation that would reflect poorly on the
Moroccan authorities and the Moroccan state). Baraka went to shake hands with the
Joseph, who pulled a bloody and very swollen hand away from him and simply nodded
his head. That night there were no MSF members in Oujda, for they were in Rabat, and
therefore Baraka promised to bring him a doctor (who would assume many risks in
visiting the camps) the next day. Bringing Joseph to the hospital is impossible, Baraka
explained to me, as the police at the hospital door demand to see nationality papers of any
black person who enters. He considered the t-shirt that Joseph was wearing on this
freezing cold night, and promised to bring Joseph a jacket when he returned the next day.
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Later, Patrick emerged from the crowd of concerned and curious friends around us, and
began speaking with me after I incessantly assured him that I was not a journalist (the
immigrants here greatly fear cameras that might reveal their identity). He said, “The
Moroccan authorities here took everything from me: my money, my passport, my
dignity.” I spoke with Miriam, a Congolese asylum-seeker, in her home located in a poor
neighborhood of Rabat. As her 3-year-old daughter, born in Morocco, played around us
in their small room, I asked about her experience as a pregnant woman during her time in
Oujda. “Oujda was not very easy,” she said, “we were very mistreated. There is nothing
there, we had no blankets; we had no house to live in there. There are not many words to
say about it, but it is very hard.” Not only do these immigrants face everyday risks, but
they also live in fear of the unannounced police raids, in which immigrants are arrested
and driven back to Oujda. On July 26th 2007, for example, there was a police raid in
Oujda in the early hours of the morning, in which those installed in the camps, both
illegal immigrants and asylum seekers—around 450—were gathered by Moroccan forces
and forced to the border. Among this group were reported at least 6 women and 4
children, one of them only 4 years old (Communiqué). The European impact on
enforcement of these police raids became clear in October of the same year, in which
massive police raids, “arresting more than 450 migrants and leaving several people
seriously injured…took place just two days after Nicolas Sarkozy’s first state visit to
Morocco” (ABCDS). The everyday risks that these immigrants face—be it from
Moroccan police, poor shelter and clothing, lack of food, or criminality— further
reinforce the grave impact of Morocco’s closed borders on humans themselves. What
was previously a temporary situation for immigrants in Oujda has now become a
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permanent one, for they cannot move forward, but cannot return home either (a result of
threatening Algerian authorities on Algeria’s border). NGO’s and various other
organizations work to denounce such treatment and offer aid, yet there is reluctance
within the Moroccan government to recognize the gravity of the situation. Morocco has
enforced the closed borders that became necessary in agreements with the European
Union, yet has not constructed necessary institutions to attend to the significant human
rights violations here.
Morocco’s own relationship with Algeria has not only created complications for
Morocco in enforcing border control tactics corresponding to European Union demands,
but has exposed Morocco’s institutional weakness in addressing relations that are of great
historical and present significance to sub-Saharan immigration. When I asked Fatima, a
Moroccan student at the University of Mohammed V in Oujda, what she thought of the
immigrants in camps surrounding her school, she answered, “they’re not doing anything
here,” she said, “they can’t work, and they just live here with nothing. They should go
back where they came from.” While returning these immigrants to their respective home
countries is a plausible solution for the current immigrants who cannot continue past
Oujda, Moroccan authorities’ continued attempt in this effort has been neither successful
nor within the bounds of human rights regulations. Whether the Moroccan police arrest
sub-Saharan immigrants during police raids within cities, or carry out raids in the camps
of Oujda, these immigrants ultimately find themselves in the ‘no-man’s land’ between
Algeria and Morocco. Abraham told me that Moroccan police, the ‘gendarmerie,”
arrested him a total of five times during his successive attempts to cross the sea from
Fnideq to Ceuta. Some instances he was arrested after swimming the 5 km that separates
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Fnideq from this Spanish province, and others he was caught before leaving the Fnideq
shore. All of these arrests, however, resulted in his deportment to a prison of Tangier or
Tetuouan, followed by his expulsion to Oujda and then to ‘no-man’s land.’
First of all, according to Moroccan Law 02-03, those arrested as illegal
immigrants in Morocco must be brought to the border of the country of his nationality, to
a country that has granted him a travel permit, or to a country that will legally accept
him.” Every time that Abraham, as well as countless other immigrants, are expelled to the
border—whether it be through police raids or isolated arrests—there is proof that
Moroccan authorities have not stayed within the limits of article 29 of this law.
Secondly, those repelled to this ‘no-man’s land’ are further subject to inhumane
treatment, for “the area is rife with Moroccan, Algerian, and Nigerian criminal groups
whose primary goal is to attack sub-Saharan immigrants and rob them of the few
possessions they have managed to hold onto during their arrest (Violence and
Immigration 11). Women are subject to even more vulnerable conditions here. Chantal, a
refugee living presently in Rabat, explained, “After the police raids, we were taken to
Magnia [at the Algerian front] by the Moroccan police. The Moroccan police violate
many women here. When we are left at the border, there is also much trafficking. I saw
Nigerians with groups of 20 women prostitutes. The women are always most vulnerable.”
If the immigrants decide to continue past ‘no-man’s land’ and into Algerian territory,
they are met with threatening Algerian police forces. In an interview with journalist
Cérise Marechaud, Congolese refugee Bétu Blanchard Hitumbé reflected that “when we
arrived here [at the border] the Algerian and Moroccan military fired in the air to disperse
us. With us, there was an asthmatic [person] and a five-month pregnant woman, who had
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just lost her baby. Four women were violated. And many more disappeared”
(Marechaud). Patrick, one of the immigrants essentially trapped in Oujda, told me “I want
to go back to my country, but I can’t even do that! I’m not a soccer ball, I can’t just be
tossed back and forth! I don’t want to stay here in Oujda, but if I try to leave, the
Algerians just fire at me, and I’m forced to return.” While the frequency of refoulements
(repulsions) to the border are great—some migrants have crossed and re-crossed this
border up to 30 times—a study done by ABCDS found that 97% of immigrants who
arrive at this border return to Oujda (Mokhliss). Thus, the sub-Saharan immigrants
contained in Oujda essentially have no other option but to establish their homes in these
camps, at the mercy of police raids on the camps, but free from the dangers of ‘no-man’s’
land.
It is clear that the relations between Algeria and Morocco have drastically altered
the situation in Oujda thus far, and that improvement on the humanitarian front rests in
the hands of those looking to improve relations between the countries. That which is
perceived as a simple solution to the detention of sub-Saharans in Morocco—to bring
them back to Algeria—becomes further complicated by Algeria’s reluctance to accept
these immigrants. Algeria’s decision to use police forces against immigrants trying to
enter their borders is one that has historical grounds, political motivation, and
humanitarian consequences. Historically, before 2004, Algeria denied responsibility for
the influx of illegal sub-Saharan immigrants into Morocco and subsequently into Europe.
In November of 2004, Algerian security forces publicly announced that Algeria had
stopped an average of 5,000 sub-Saharan immigrants since 2001, and that these migrants
no longer transited through Algeria. While this would leave Mauritania as the remaining
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transitory country into Morocco, followed by their passage over the Western Sahara, a
2005 report revealed that the majority of immigrants did not use such a route. According
to Moroccan police monitory the security of Southern Morocco, 90% of foreign
immigrants stopped in the Sahara come from the north of Morocco and passed through
the Algerian-Moroccan frontier, and a minority come from Mauritania (Lahlou).
In blatantly denying any responsibility to the migrants entering Morocco, Algeria
has attempted to exploit immigration in order to fulfill its personal objectives. In various
matters surrounding Moroccan and Algerian relations, Algeria hoped to gain advantage
within the eyes of the European Union by denying any role in Morocco’s influx of illegal
sub-Saharan immigrants. For example, the long-disputed territory of the Western Sahara
is one such impediment to peaceful relations between Algeria and Morocco. In refusing
to accept responsibility in the situation of immigration, Algeria hoped to place itself in a
favorable position within the fight for the Western Sahara. In an article released by BBC
news in 2005, Moroccan Foreign Minister Mohammed Benaissa refuted the Polisario
Front’s accusations that Morocco had left immigrants stranded at the Algerian desert
border, stating that the “accusations were propaganda orchestrated by the Polisario Front
and its ally, Algeria...the campaign Algeria is launching against Morocco to deviate
attention away from the real issue, the Sahara issue” (Harter). The Polisario Front,
fighting for Western Saharan independence, stands against Morocco, who annexed the
Western Sahara territory in 1975. As is this case with such public accusations, the fluid
lines drawn between Algeria and Morocco’s shared immigration issues and their external
relations have caused even greater obstacles to addressing the humanitarian treatment of
sub-Saharan immigrants.
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Without strong institutions within Morocco to forge positive cooperation with
Algeria in addressing the issue of sub-Saharan migration, there is presently no concrete
effort to share responsibility for this issue. In addition, Algeria itself has continued to
remain on the outskirts of the present dialogue between Morocco and the European
Union. Lucile Dumas, president of the association ATTAC Maroc, explained to me that
as of 2005, Algeria signed its own Association Accord with the European Union,
whereby in exchange for 10 million Euros, Algeria was to deport immigrants in its
borders to the southern border of the Sahara, near Mali. Additionally, Algeria adopted its
own law concerning illegal immigration. Despite the agreements made between Algeria
and the European Union to reduce illegal sub-Saharan immigration, there is recent
evidence of Algeria’s reluctance to address the migration issue, and most specifically, to
converse with Morocco of this issue.
At the July 2006 Euro-African conference on Migration in Development in Rabat,
30 European state members, 28 African state members, and international and regional
organizations convened to write an action plan and policy declaration regarding these
issues. Algeria boycotted this conference, stating that it condemned the developed
countries of Europe “satisfying the growing needs of their own economies” and refused
to be the “police officer of Europe” in regards to immigration control (Benchabane). In
addition, the element of Algeria’s refusal to accept immigrants back through its borders
has complicated relations between Morocco and Algeria. Many perceive this tight
Algerian security, coined by the phrase “human ping-pong” game between Algeria and
Morocco, to be a result of Algerian’s wish to further disrupt Morocco’s efforts in
combating sub-Saharan immigration. Nonetheless, there is also the view that both Algeria
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and Morocco are attempting, in their respective ways, to uphold the EU plan for
immigration; this is seen in Morocco’s continuous refoulements to the border and
Algeria’s ability to reject these immigrants. According to Lucile Dumas of ATTAC
Maroc, “the problem lies in the money incentives given to both Morocco and Algeria in
the name of ‘developing’ Africa. “The more money there is sent to Morocco, the more
repressive the conditions of immigration are at the border. But the development of Africa
shouldn’t be conditioned on harsher border controls,” she explained, in an interview with
me. While the motives of each Morocco and Algeria in responding to European pressure
regarding sub-Saharan immigration may not be clear now, it is apparent that there are
many obstacles preventing peaceful solutions. Furthermore, Morocco has made little
success in positively confronting Algeria in order to cooperate on migration efforts.
Morocco’s relations with both the European Union and Algeria have shaped many
decisions that the Moroccan state has made within its own borders to address the
immigration of sub-Saharans, and have furthermore revealed Morocco’s lack of
institutional power to effectively grapple with this complicated phenomenon. Immigrants
entering Morocco before the tight crackdown on border controls had greater freedom to
move onwards from Oujda, while presently it has become nearly impossible for migrants
to leave Oujda and continue to Rabat (a common destination). When buying a train ticket
in Oujda, Hicham Baraka told me, sub-Saharans are quite often asked to prove their
legality with a ‘carte de séjour’ or with a student identity card, based solely on their skin
color. During his train ride from Oujda to Rabat, the controller asked Pasteur Willy
Bayanga for his ticket, then proceeded to demand Bayanga’s national papers, which—
despite much much dispute—he refused to show (Bayanga 249). This enforcement at the
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train station has led a number of immigrants to either walk the route of the train from
Oujda to Rabat (a distance of roughly 600 km), or to hang onto the outside of the train
during the ride. On my own train passage back to Rabat, five young men clung to the
outside of the train, only to be driven off by guards at the train’s first stopping.
In signing the 2004 “Financial Convention Relative to the Administration of the
Controlled Frontiers Between Morocco and the EU,” Morocco agreed to the objectives
concerning border control integrated by the EU. In return for 40 million Euros, one of
Morocco’s plans under this agreement was to agree to enforce joint implementation of
Spain’s SIVE, the ‘Integrated Surveillance of Exterior Vigilance,’ (started by Spain in
2002) which includes patrol on the Mediterranean waters. In the beginning of 2005, one
of the workers for SIVE stated that “Of 100 migrants that take the sea illegally, 95 are
stopped and five are probably dead.” In addition to interception on the waters, arrests at
the border of Ceuta, the Spanish territory in northern Morocco, and Melila, are also quite
common. Cameroonian native Abraham explained to me that between 2005 and 2008,
following five attempts between 2005 and 2008 to reach Spain, he was arrested, and after
stays in Tangier and Tetouen prison cells that included “a small piece of bread, no water,
and an empty plastic bottle to [function as a toilet]”, was refouled to ‘no-man’s land.’
Abraham’s accounts reflect the statement of Professor Amarti in Oujda, that “Morocco
has moved from a transit country for migrants to one that now is hosting immigrants.” As
Abraham is presently living without papers in Rabat, it is clear that the conditions of
refoulement from one border to the next are neither humane, nor effective in dissuading
migrants’ desperate attempts to reach Europe.
With Morocco’s changing identity, from that of transit country sending Moroccan
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emigrants to Europe, to one that is essentially hosting sub-Saharan immigrants, there has
been further need to create institutions in order to effectively incorporate such a
population within the domestic plans for Morocco. In addition, there has been reluctance
within Morocco’s policies to establish a firm difference between the status of an illegal
immigrant, an asylum seeker, and a refugee. There is an undeniable population of subSaharans living presently in Morocco, which establishes Morocco as a host country more
than a temporary place of residency. While walking the streets of one of Rabat’s poorest
neighborhoods, Taqadoum, Abraham and I greeted many of his friends who live as he
does amongst Moroccans here. Abraham explained that he rents a home from a Moroccan
family, one that is twice as high as it would be if he were Moroccan. He pointed to
children playing on his street as we walked, and asked himself out loud why they weren’t
in school. I passed along the same question during an interview with a program manager
of the UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) in Rabat, who
answered that there could be any number of reasons for this lack of schooling. He first
cited that although refugees are given the opportunity to attend Moroccan public school,
at times there is fear among sub-Saharan refugees to enroll their children for fear of
‘Islamization,’ the lacking means of transportation to a from school, a language barrier,
or the problems that arise from a difference in the educational level between a Moroccan
youth and refugee child of the same age. It becomes clear that strengthening the
Moroccan government’s own involvement with the HCR, the only present Moroccan
institution governing not only determination of refugee status, but also implementing a
series of programs to best aid the refugees living presently in Morocco.
The HCR has been present in Morocco since 1965, and in July of 2007 the HCR
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and the Kingdom of Morocco signed an agreement stating that the Kingdom of Morocco
would agree to permit the HCR to act as a representation of its international mission and
mandate as it applies to the Geneva Convention of 1951. As of September 2008, the
HCR has recognized 877 refugees and there are 369 asylum seekers (Note Explicative).
The HCR in Morocco has implemented a number of projects in order to facilitate the
support of refugees, and continues to work with the Kingdom of Morocco in order to
further enforce the proper treatment of this group. The HCR's broad projects include
offering language help, education for school children, and access to medical facilities in
Morocco. One such front on which the HCR has made progress is with regards to
recognition of refugee status. When an asylum seeker is granted this status, he is given a
magnetic card to prove this status; as of 2008 a magnetic card, harder to falsify and to
destroy, replaced the previous papers that had been used in 2007. This was of special
importance, for Chantal explained to me that during the December raid of 2006 in Rabat,
she was gathered up with other illegal immigrants she was living with, and refouled to the
border, despite her refugee status and this clear violation of Moroccan law 02-03. "They
police broke down our door in December, at three in the morning. They gave us no time
to dress, no time to gather our things. You show them your paper, and they told me they
didn't recognize it. We were put on buses to Oujda. By the time we got there, it was the
day time, so the HCR could come and help the refugees back to Rabat." The police
destroyed the refugee papers during the raids. She brought out her magnetic card to show
me, saying that it still won’t protect her from being arrested and taken to prison in the
event of another police raid—the police “pretend they don’t recognize it.” Following
arrest, however, the card will prove to members of the HCR who arrive at prison that
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these refugees should not be refouled to the border.
Another project of the HCR in Morocco is to work with refugees on small microprojects that could help them earn a living while in Morocco, although such work is
confined to the informal sector of Morocco. The Moroccan state's refusal to grant
refugees necessary documentation that would enable them to work in the formal sector, a
carte de séjour, represents further reluctance on Morocco’s part to integrate this
population into society. When refugees and illegal immigrants cannot find work in the
informal sector, whether artisan or construction work, they must look elsewhere. Chantal
explained to me that there are many women she knows, living in Rabat, who are
"obligated to prostitution" in order to feed their families and take care of their children;
there are others who work as maids in Moroccan homes, and have been abused and
impregnated under such conditions, yet have no other way to turn. As a result, the HCR
continues to instill dialogue with the Moroccan government about the aid that a carte de
séjour would provide to these refugees. In addition, the HCR continues to collaborate
with international and Moroccan organizations to create awareness on behalf of the
refugees living in a vulnerable situation. These organizations offer medical and
educational support, and some are concerned with awareness raising about the presence
of refugees in Morocco (Note Explicative).
Concerning the recent increase in efforts to hold sub-Saharan immigrants within
Moroccan borders, I asked this HCR employee if the closed borders enforced by
Moroccan police had any relation to the present determination of refugee status in
Morocco, and the number of refugees living in Morocco. He answered that there is not a
correlation here, for the HCR's work in distinguishing refugees from illegal immigrants is
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governed by strict adherence to the criteria set forth within the Geneva Convention, and
does not relate to the number of migrants entering Morocco. There are those who doubt
that there is no correlation between border control and the refugee status grants in
Morocco, including Lucile Dumas of ATTAC Maroc, who feels as though “The HCR is
playing a game right now…with borders more closed, and more pressure from Europe,
there is no longer the right to asylum—which can only function in an open circulation
world. The job of the HCR is to protect refugees, not to go in the direction of the EU at
all times.” Miriam’s situation in Rabat seems to echo this statement, for when I asked her
what she hopes to see in her future, she answered, “I want to live in peace, so when there
is peace in my country [of the Democratic Republic of Congo], I will return. I do not
want to stay here, but I cannot go back to war." Miriam explained to me that she had
applied for refugee status with the HCR, yet had been denied based on her first interview
with their office. In waiting to hear if her application has been reviewed again, she and
her daughter live in an illegal. Francois Crepeau, author of Droit d’Asile – De
l’Hospitalité aux contrôles migratoires, supports the view that there is a correlation
between European goals and the number of refugees recognized. Crepeau writes that
there is an apparent change in the HCR’s rhetoric over recent years, one that has gone
from promoting the “right to flee” to the “right to stay.” Furthermore, in his thesis on the
HCR, Michael Barutciski writes that “certain skeptical analysts consider that it is not by
chance that the HCR, which is financed principally by rich countries, is interested in
‘internal displacement’ at the same time as the policies of immigration and migratory
control become more and more severe (Valluy 31-32). The financial support from
European countries is one that appears to have had a profound impact on the HCR’s role
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in Morocco.
While waiting for her application to be reviewed by the HCR, Miriam has found
work by cutting hair of other migrants in her Rabat neighborhoods, who have formed a
tight-knit community. Because the protection offered by the HCR is not universal for all
immigrants entering Morocco, a number of immigrants have found support amongst
themselves to organize and raise awareness of their plight. Pasteur Willy Bayanga and
others founded the "Council of Sub-Saharan Immigrants in Morocco" in order to create a
structure for those without papers that "makes concrete the necessity for male and female
immigrants in Morocco to take between their hands their own destiny, and the defense of
their elementary rights (Bayanga 10).” Bayanga explained to me that of the many
concerns facing those without papers is that they are not often aware of the rights they
possess, an area which his council hopes to improve upon. As the limited support of the
HCR is only for refugees, the remaining support for sub-Saharan migrants comes from
their own cohesion.
The desperate situation of refugees such as Chantal and asylum seekers such as
Miriam, highlights the flaws of the Moroccan government in working effectively with the
only official institution collaborating on behalf of refugees. Morocco does not to this day
have a legislative body within its government, present in a number of countries, to
collaborate with the HCR's work, which is present in a number of other countries. Due to
its absence, the Rabat bureau has discretion over both registering the asylum seekers and
in recognizing their refugee status according to the mandate in line with the Geneva
Convention. Nonetheless, the HCR must continue to foster dialogue with the Moroccan
government about the importance of achieving this legislative body in order to further
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make progress regarding Morocco’s treatment of refugees. Still others feel as if the
responsibility for the lack of prime functionality of the HCR within Morocco lies with the
European Union, who first encouraged accords between the UNHCR and Moroccan
government. Mehdi Lahlou feels as though the EU’s purpose in installing such an
institution was not for the best protection of refugees. In an interview, Mehdi Lahou
stated, “the HCR's intervention in Morocco, which is to protect the rights of these
refugees, more represents a way for the European Union to effectively cover the true
objectives of the European Union in externalizing the immigration from its own borders,
than a true concern for the rights of these refugees." In order to best protect the interests
of the refugees, it appears as if further dialogue must arise regarding functionality of the
HCR that is optimal for Morocco, and not solely in the interests of the European Union.
Morocco’s long-lasting and historical familiarity with migration of peoples is one
that has not only has affected its economic, political, and social relations with other
countries, but has been likewise greatly shaped by these very relations. In addition,
migration has had a profound and deep impact on Morocco’s position within the world,
in regards to its geographic location in Africa, union with the Mediterranean, and
growing responsiveness to the European Union. This established identity, one that was
for years characterized by the emigrants living abroad has recently been drastically
changed by the influx of sub-Saharan populations immigrating across Moroccan borders,
living within its neighborhoods, and beginning to unite and become vocal in their
demands for rights. It is clear that the European presence within Morocco has
considerably shaped the Moroccan state’s methods of coping with such a new
phenomenon as sub-Saharan immigration. This presence—be it in the form of accords
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signed with Morocco, or in conferences organized between members of the European
Union and Morocco—has commenced and sustained Morocco’s efforts for more secure
borders, its law and police enforcement throughout the state, as well as its work in
incorporating these new persons into society. Algerian’s own relations with Morocco
have further complicated Morocco’s dealings on an everyday level with the situation of
immigrants in Morocco. These external relations have all contributed to constant,
demanding, and surmounting challenges for Morocco in upholding true respect for the
rights of these sub-Saharan immigrants. It is clear that thus far, the proper institutions
that would effectively aid Morocco in best handling its current position have not yet been
created. Furthermore, the few institutions that may today best improve Morocco’s
incorporation of sub-Saharan immigrants within their border have yet to be fully
developed. As a result, Morocco is a prime representation of a country that is constantly
in the process of positively developing amidst much external pressure and emerging
domestic issues of great concern to the outcome of this development.
It remains clear to this day that Morocco lacks the necessary institutional capacity
to uphold an increasingly important respect for human rights while simultaneously
carrying out agreements made with the European Union in respect to combating subSaharan immigration. Despite such challenges that Morocco has faced thus far, there are
a number of objectives that Morocco could work towards in order to arrive at the most
optimal solutions within its own state. First, in regards to its relationship with the
European Union, Morocco must engage in agreements with European countries while
maintaining a balance that promotes its own interests as a developing nation. Fostering a
community within its borders that holds human rights as a priority, while still enforcing
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law, should be first to carrying out the wishes of external powers. While Morocco
receives financial benefits for enforcement such as border control, it has kept its own
interests, such as those establishing strong institutions, secondary to the interests of
European nations. On another front, it is clear that Morocco’s relations with Algeria have
much to gain in for the future, and that more peaceful dialogue between these countries
can only aid Morocco’s involvement with sub-Saharan immigration. Cooperation with
Algeria would be the most beneficial strategy in improving the situation at Morocco’s
border that is of constant threat to human rights and migrant treatment. These strategies
in cooperating with Algeria should be forged on the condition that external issues
surrounding Algerian-Moroccan relations, such as the issue of control over the Western
Sahara, be excluded. Morocco’s implementation of internal institutions for the
betterment of external dialogue with nations would be the most effective policy that
Morocco could enact in improving sub-Saharan immigration flows.
While it remains one of the most difficult to foster, even among the presence of
supporting institutions, establishing a positive dialogue within Moroccan society is one
that would yield the most effective results for Morocco in improving the situation of subSaharan migration. Based on the contemporary fear of the ‘other’ as a threat to traditions
and unity within a nation, it is clear that Morocco too possesses a reluctance to socially
recognize the presence of sub-Saharans in Morocco. To this day, there exists a very
entrenched discrimination of sub-Saharan immigrants living amongst Moroccan citizens.
Chantal, holding refugee status in Morocco, told me, “[the Moroccan people] call us
azeeah here, which means monkey… There is money put into Morocco from Europe, but
mentality is necessary to address. The color of my skin is important here. In addition to
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the importance of movement towards greater cultural sensitivity, Morocco must
transform its thinking from the position of a country sending its own citizens as emigrants
to Europe, to one accepting incoming immigrants. Such an adjustment does not only
have logistical, economic, and political effects on a nation, however. It is clear that this
transformation has had a very deep and significant impact on Moroccan society, and its
identity amidst other world powers.
In speaking with Mohammed, a member of ABCDS, he best explained to me that
this alteration from emigrant country to host country of immigrants must spur Moroccans
to examine their own treatment of sub-Saharan immigrants. He said, “Morocco should
be concerned about this issue, for when they go abroad to Europe and demand to be
treated well, Europe can just say right back to them “look what you’re doing within your
own country.” You’re doing the same thing inside your country…it is true, there is a war
against the immigrants. The reality of the migration situation within Morocco has caused
its people to examine their treatment abroad and the treatment of those within their home
borders. It is when such examination yields positive dialogue and mindset, as well as
proactive solutions to this migration, that Morocco can only benefit within all pillars of
its society. There must first be awareness of this dynamic, followed by acceptance of this
new population within Moroccan society. Active measures to defeat the present
discrimination must follow in order to better integrate these people into Moroccan
culture. Institutions to promote positive dialogue surrounding sub-Saharan peoples in
Morocco, while effective in reflecting improvements on a psychological front, are not
sufficient. It remains clear that the deepest impact on fostering constructive actions
within the social sphere lies in the very mind of every Moroccan confronting such a
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modern phenomenon as this migration.
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